IAN HELFRICH PhD / ECONOMICS

SPATIAL INVESTMENT LAB / ASHEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA

Where should an incentive
budget go?

Regional growth depends on what is additional.
Local opportunity also depends on where it lands.

POLICY SCENARIOObserved economic geography · explicit behavioral assumptionsPreparing the model
ASHEVILLE, NC35.59° N / 82.56° W
Existing employmentColumn height = 2023 primary jobs
Teal: baseline · gold: investment cluster
1 km cells · six hypothetical location choices

Connecting 3D terrain…

Map layer
Additional study-area jobs…Conditional on assumptions
Cost / additional job-year…Discounted · dollars, not fiscal return
Lower-earnings access gain…Gravity-weighted job opportunities
Inspect a locationSelect a column or cluster to inspect employment and the policy’s local effect.

02 / SPATIAL ALLOCATION

Which places expand access?

Allocate the same budget across six existing employment clusters. The objective balances average access for all resident workers with access for lower-earnings workers.

Continuous allocation subject to a concentration cap. Locations are analytical cells, not verified available properties or incentive-eligible parcels.

03 / DISTRIBUTION

Who gains access?

Change in average gravity-weighted job opportunities, using each group’s residential geography.

Monthly primary-job earnings: ≤$1,250; $1,251–$3,333; >$3,333. These are worker earnings groups, not household income or hiring outcomes.

04 / ALLOCATION TRADE-OFF

Does the objective change the choice?

Optimal allocation at five distributional weights, holding the concentration cap fixed.

Piecewise linear optimization can yield identical allocations across several weights. No unobserved trade-off is manufactured.

05 / ADDITIONALITY

How much growth survives?

Additional study-area jobs under alternative site-additionality and relocation assumptions.

Rows: site additionality. Columns: within-study-area relocation. This is scenario sensitivity, not a confidence interval.

MODEL / REPRODUCIBILITY

The counterfactual
behind the incentive.

An incentive offer is an expenditure. Its effect depends on which location decisions it changes, how much activity it shifts within the study area, and how long additional jobs persist. This demonstration connects that accounting to observed employment and a directed road network.

Loading source coverage…

Asheville is a bounded worked example. This prototype does not estimate a causal incentive response, an agglomeration multiplier, a fiscal return or a general-equilibrium growth path.

Download source manifest ↗ · Download model inputs ↗
Additional employment and cost accounting

Q = B / s   ·   N = Q · a · (1 − d)

B is an upfront incentive budget, s the incentive paid per offered job, a the share whose site choice changes, and d the share of induced site jobs relocated from other cells in the study area. Q is the number of supported offers; N is the conditional additional job stock. All supported offers incur the incentive cost, including those without additionality.

Cost / job-year = B / [N · Σₜ₌₁ᵀ (1 + r)⁻ᵗ]

Additional jobs are assumed to persist at a constant level for T years, with end-of-year discounting at r. At zero net job growth the cost ratio is undefined, even if relocation improves access. Fractional jobs are expected quantities in a continuous scenario. There is no wage, tax revenue, multiplier, construction-cost or benefit-cost model.

Spatial counterfactual and allocation problem

Six candidate cells are selected in descending order of existing primary employment, retaining centres separated by at least 2 km on the UTM grid. Let xₖ be the budget share in candidate k. Induced site employment Qaxₖ is added there. Relocated jobs Qad are removed from all study cells in proportion to baseline employment, including candidate cells. This donor pattern is an explicit simplifying assumption.

ΔJⱼ = Q a Σₖ xₖ 1[j=k] − Q a d · Jⱼ / Σₘ Jₘ

Optimization maximizes a weighted mean of all-worker and lower-earnings access, subject to xₖ ≥ 0, Σₖxₖ = 1 and xₖ ≤ the concentration cap. With constant subsidy and response assumptions across sites, the objective is linear: allocate in descending score order until the cap binds. The fixed donor term does not affect the site ranking. Cluster cards report gross induced jobs and the net cell change after donor subtraction. Equal allocation is a comparison policy. No site-specific construction capacity or cost is inferred.

Accessibility, road costs and aggregation

Aᵢ = Σⱼ Jⱼ · exp[−ln(2) · tᵢⱼ / h]

Directed shortest-path travel time tᵢⱼ weights jobs by half-life h. Unreachable destinations contribute zero. Residential primary-job counts weight group means. ΔAᵢ uses ΔJⱼ in the same expression. This is potential access, with no skill matching, commuting-flow prediction, job competition or hiring effect.

2020 Census-block centroid records are summed into 1 km UTM zone 17N cells. Each cell centre snaps to the largest weakly connected road component within 750 m. Access connectors use 15 mph and within-cell travel uses two minutes. Mapped numeric speeds and one-way restrictions are retained. Speed fallbacks are 55 mph motorway, 45 trunk, 35 primary, 30 secondary, 25 tertiary/unclassified, 20 residential/link and 10 living street.

Roads extend beyond the study window to permit detours. Job destinations and residential weights are limited to the window. Turn restrictions, intersection delay, traffic, service/private roads and transit are omitted. The road snapshot and 2023 employment have different vintages. Grid aggregation, centroid snapping and missing external opportunities limit interpretation.

3D encodings and empirical limits

Employment columns use 0.2 display metres per primary job, with a 20 m minimum marker. Investment columns use 250 display metres per $1 million allocated, with a 20 m minimum for positive allocations; zero allocations are hidden. Access-change columns show the magnitude of ΔA, scaled within the current scenario; teal denotes a gain and rust a loss. The access layer shows cells with resident workers; all modeled cells remain in exports. Heights are statistical encodings, not buildings or flood depths. Terrain is sampled at column centres; Cesium attribution remains visible.

Default policy parameters are illustrative, not calibrated to Asheville, a specific tax program, or the research literature. The Bartik research review on incentive additionality motivates examining the counterfactual, but supplies no estimated coefficient to this prototype. No current incentive eligibility, available land, employer commitments or project costs have been verified.

Source provenance and licensing

U.S. Census Bureau LODES 8.4: 2023 North Carolina WAC and RAC, S000, JT01 primary jobs, plus the 2020-block crosswalk. Public LODES uses disclosure protection; small-area counts are not exact employer records. Technical documentation.

Roads and rivers © OpenStreetMap contributors, ODbL. OSM-derived graph and geometry in the download retain that license. Census counts are U.S. public data. The source manifest records query, retrieval date, snapshot and SHA-256 hashes. Scripts and numerical checks live with the website source.

Scenario exports include inputs, accounting, allocations, cell results, source provenance and coverage. No client data or private credentials are included.